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Summary
When the state and federal health insurance exchanges were introduced in 2013, much attention was paid to
the logistics of their launch. Nearly a year later, policymakers should now be looking at a different question:
how can we collect and use data from the exchanges to understand how consumers think about insurance
choice, so as to make the exchanges function better?
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Now, as the rollout of the exchanges 
approaches its one-year anniversary, poli-
cymakers should be looking at a different 
question: how can we collect and use data 
from the exchanges to understand how 
consumers think about insurance choice, so 
as to make the exchanges function better?
As research I conducted with my col-
league Benjamin Handel shows, doing this 
requires a new way of looking at the data 
on health insurance consumption.1 The 
traditional model of insurance choice treats 
insurance as a purely financial product, 
sought by fully informed and risk-averse 
consumers seeking to protect themselves 
from financial loss in the event of illness 
or injury.2 Individuals are willing to pay a 
higher premium for a plan if it reduces their 
expected out-of-pocket spending, and the 
extent of their willingness to pay increases in 
tandem with their level of risk aversion. The 
model assumes that consumers, in selecting 
an insurance product, are able to reason-
ably estimate their expected out-of-pocket 
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When the state and federal health insurance exchanges were 
introduced in 2013, much attention was paid to the logistics 
of their launch, particularly the malfunctioning of the online 
technology and the need to drive a sufficient number of 
consumers (especially younger and healthier consumers) to the 
marketplaces so as to make them viable. 
 
brief in brief
• Good policymaking with respect to regu-
lating health insurance markets requires 
a clear understanding of how individual 
consumers make insurance choices.
• The traditional model of health insurance 
choice assumes that consumers regard 
insurance as a purely financial product.
• But in actuality, there are many non-financial 
factors that affect consumer choice—
notably, people may have inaccurate or 
unclear beliefs about their health care 
costs and the insurance options available 
(“information frictions”); they also have 
preferences about the “hassle costs” of 
dealing with a particular plan’s reimburse-
ment and billing processes.
• Research shows that information frictions 
and perceived hassle costs can cause 
some consumers to disregard insurance 
plan options that in fact would be better 
for them financially.
• Survey data can help policymakers better 
understand consumer decision-making, 
and identify needed improvements to con-
sumer education programs and to the 
design of the health insurance exchanges.
expenditures, accurately understand the 
features of the different insurance options, 
and are willing to pay a higher premium 
for a plan if it looks to reduce the mean or 
variation of out-of-pocket spending.
In actuality, however, modern health 
insurance is not a purely financial product. 
Many factors besides financial risk protec-
tion go into a consumer’s decision of which 
insurance plan to purchase.3 People evaluate 
plans by the types of care they cover and 
the access they give to specific hospitals 
and physician networks. Moreover, certain 
plan features like Health Savings Accounts 
and Flexible Spending Accounts introduce 
administrative hassles related to reimburse-
ments and billing that can be off-putting for 
some consumers. Choosing insurance thus is 
a more complex choice that goes beyond the 
straightforward calculation of financial risk; 
consumers may be willing to pay more for a 
plan with particular non-financial attributes.
Choosing health insurance also is 
complex because of “information fric-
tions”—instances of incomplete or inac-
curate information. Even if one takes into 
account the many facets of health insurance 
in the standard model, consumers may not 
have a clear understanding of the distinct 
attributes of different insurance plans or the 
“hassle costs” associated with each one. They 
also may not be able to accurately forecast 
the costs of becoming sick, especially given 
the variety of potential health conditions 
they might face, treatment options available, 
and the price variations that exist across dif-
ferent treatment locations.4
While the existence of information 
frictions seems logical, showing their effects 
empirically is challenging, as it requires 
access to a substantial amount of data on 
insurance plan choices, plan attributes, 
as well as consumer beliefs about those 
attributes. We were able to surmount this 
data hurdle by conducting a study, looking 
at health benefits choices made by a group 
of employees at a single large firm in 2011 
and 2012, in which we were able to combine 
detailed administrative data (i.e., data on 
actual health insurance choices and patient 
claims) with a comprehensive survey in 
which the employees’ answers were linked 
to the administrative data at the individual 
level. The survey was designed to identify 
consumer information frictions as well as 
typically unobservable hassle costs. The 
results of our analysis, described below, 
point to the need to change the way in 
which policymakers and exchange regulators 
think about which types of plans to allow, 
how those plans should be priced, and how 
information about them should be commu-
nicated to consumers.
THE DATA
The firm we worked with had over 50,000 
employees, the average income of whom was 
higher than that of the general population, 
and who seemed more likely to have the 
education, resources, and cognitive skills 
necessary to overcome information frictions. 
Most of the employees tracked in this data 
faced a choice between two different health 
insurance options: a Preferred Provider 
Organization (PPO) with generous first 
dollar coverage, and a High-Deductible 
Health Plan (HDHP). In financial terms, 
the HDHP entailed a substantial deductible 
as well as higher co-insurance rates, and it 
linked to a health savings account (HSA). 
However, while the plans differed in their 
financial characteristics, because they both 
were administered by the same insurer and 
were self-insured plans, they were identical 
in all other key features, including having 
the same network of health care providers. 
Table 1 provides a side-by-side comparison 
of these different features.
 As of 2010, the share of employees that 
had selected the HDHP option remained 
below 1 percent. Overwhelmingly, employ-
ees opted for the PPO. Then, starting in 
2011, the employer modified the parameters 
of the HDHP plan and started an exten-
sive education and marketing campaign 
 1  This brief is based on Benjamin R. Handel and Jonathan 
T. Kolstad, “Health Insurance for Humans: Information 
Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare,” Working 
Paper 19373 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19373.pdf. 
 2  Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz, “Equilibrium in 
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Eco-
nomics of Imperfect Information,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 90 (1976), 630-649.
 3  See also Katherine Ho, “Insurer-Provider Networks in the 
Medical Care Market,” The American Economic Review 
99 (2009), 393-430; David M. Cutler, Mark McClellan, 
and Joseph P. Newhouse, “How Does Managed Care 
Do it?” The RAND Journal of Economics 31 (2000), 526-
548.
 4  For other research on information frictions in insurance 
choice, see Jeffrey R. Kling, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar 
Shafir, Lee Vermeulen, and Marian Wrobel, “Comparison 
Friction: Experimental Evidence from Medicare Drug 
Plans,” Working Paper 17410 (National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w17410; Jason Abaluck and Jonathan Gruber, “Choice 
Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: Evidence from Plan 
Choice in the Medicare Part D Program,” American 
Economic Review 101 (2011), 1180-1210.
 5  Richard J. Zeckhauser demonstrates that this tradeoff 
between reduced medical spending and increased 
risk exposure is fundamental to optimal insurance plan 
TABLE 1:  KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO PRIMARY PLANS STUDIED
 * Employee+1 Tier is 2x Individual Amount, 3+ tier is 2.5x Individual Amount
 ** For 2 or more, $6,250 is max. contribution
 *** For out-of-network spending, PPO has a deductible of $100 per person (up to $300) and an out-of-pocket max. of $400 per   
  person (up to $1200)
 
Health Plan Characteristics PPO HDHP
Premium 0 0
Health Savings Account (HSA) No Yes
HSA Subsidy* - $1,500
Max. HSA Contribution** - $3,100
Deductible* 0*** $1,500
Coinsurance (IN) 0% 10%
Coinsurance (OUT) 20% 30%
Out-of-Pocket Max.* 0*** $2,500
Provider Network Same as HDHP Same as PPO
to encourage more employees to move to 
the HDHP, with the intention of phasing 
out the PPO and making the HDHP the 
only option by 2013. Consequently, HDHP 
enrollment increased to 8.25 percent in 
2011 and to 13.25 percent in 2012—still, a 
relatively small share of all employees.
Because we also had access to actual 
health expenditure data, we were able to 
calculate the share of employees that, in 
retrospect, would have been better off in the 
HDHP. What we found was that, assum-
ing all employees contributed the maximum 
amount to their HSA, 73 percent of them 
should have switched to the HDHP in 
2011—not merely the 8.25 percent that 
actually did. Perhaps more striking, even if 
employees made no contribution to their 
HSA, still 35 percent of them would have 
been better off financially in the HDHP.
Why did such a small share of these 
employees embrace the HDHP, when so 
many of them would have benefitted from 
it? Were these employees simply risk-averse, 
and therefore more attracted to the financial 
characteristics of the PPO? This is what the 
traditional model of insurance choice would 
suggest. Their behavior could, however, 
result from a lack of accurate information 
about the different plan features between 
the PPO and HDHP, or a lack of under-
standing about their likely medical expen-
ditures, or beliefs about provider networks 
or administrative hassles entailed by one 
plan versus the other. It is this possibility we 
want to explore further.
In order to measure the extent to 
which information frictions and beliefs 
about hassle costs and other non-financial 
attributes affected the choices made by 
these employees, we developed a survey 
instrument, which we sent in March 2012 
to 4,500 employees across three different 
groups: (1) employees that had been in the 
HDHP in 2011 and remained in it as of 
2012; (2) new 2012 HDHP enrollees; and 
(3) those in the PPO plan.
As outlined in Tables 2 and 3, the 
survey questions covered four major areas of 
benefits selection:
• Knowledge of the financial features of 
the HDHP: Could respondents correctly 
answer questions requiring knowledge of 
the key financial features of the HDHP?
• Beliefs about plan attributes and medi-
cal expenses: Did respondents have an 
accurate understanding of the PPO and 
HDHP networks of providers? And could 
they accurately assess past and expected 
future medical expenditures?
• Time and hassle costs: What did respon-
dents expect about the time required 
to manage their HSA and HDHP, and 
what was their tolerance for hassle in the 
HDHP?
• Personal assessment of the effort 
respondents devoted to choosing a plan, the 
clarity of their beliefs about the available 
plans, and their level of satisfaction with 
their choice.
Analysis of the survey data indeed 
reveals information frictions that basic 
administrative data cannot capture. Only 
37 percent of employees, for instance, could 
correctly estimate how much they had 
spent on health care in the previous year, 
despite the fact that the majority expressed 
confidence in their estimation. Moreover, 
only 35 percent of respondents understood 
that the provider networks for the PPO and 
HDHP were identical, while almost half 
answered that they were “not sure” as to how 
design.  See “Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the 
Tradeoff between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incen-
tives,” Journal of Economic Theory 2 (1970), 10-26.
TABLE 2:  RESPONSE TO PLAN FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS SURVEY QUESTIONS
 
Question Correct Incorrect Not Sure
What is the deductible under the HDHP? 27.08% 22.40% 50.53% 
HDHP-Existing 52.68 11.23 36.10 
HDHP-New  50.79 13.49 35.73 
PPO  21.53 24.66 53.82
How much is the employer HDHP subsidy? 31.42 19.94 48.64 
HDHP-Existing 73.40 11.05 15.54 
HDHP-New 68.65 11.21 20.14 
PPO 22.50 21.92 55.58
What is the out-of-pocket max. under the HDHP? 18.47 21.98 59.55 
HDHP-Existing 28.32 22.11 49.57 
HDHP-New 31.87 18.91 49.21 
PPO 15.85 22.31 61.84
What is the coinsurance rate under the HDHP? 18.56 25.64 55.80 
HDHP-Existing 33.85 21.24 44.91 
HDHP-New 29.07 21.37 49.56 
PPO 15.66 26.61 57.73
Do you get to keep HSA funds after the end of the year? 75.69 9.23 15.08 
HDHP-Existing 96.73 1.38 1.90 
HDHP-New 94.22 1.75 4.03 
PPO 71.23 10.96 17.81
How much is $1000 worth in pre-tax dollars? 14.50 44.86 40.64 
HDHP-Existing 16.93 31.78 51.30 
HDHP-New 15.76 42.73 41.51 
PPO 14.09 46.58 39.33
the networks of the two plans compared. 
The level of incorrect and uncertain beliefs 
about a plan attribute like provider network 
that is relatively straightforward, as well as 
described clearly in information provided by 
the employer, only underscores the extent to 
which information frictions exist. And the 
existence of these information frictions was 
consequential. Respondents who believed 
(incorrectly) that the PPO had the larger 
provider network only chose the HDHP 6 
percent of the time, even though they would 
have been better off doing so 40 percent of 
the time.
The results also are revealing with 
regard to hassle costs. Compared to those 
who had direct experience with the HDHP, 
a much larger share of PPO respondents 
believed that they would need to spend at 
least 20 hours of their time to deal with it. 
Almost 90% of the PPO enrollees expressed 
at least some concern about the amount of 
time required to manage the HDHP, even 
though they did not have direct experience 
with that plan.
In sum, the results confirm that 
information frictions exist within many of 
the key choice dimensions that consumers 
consider when purchasing health insurance. 
They also suggest that information frictions 
and perceived hassle costs play a critical role 
in shaping consumer choice.
QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT
Taking the analysis one step further, we 
developed a series of econometric models 
to put the impact of information frictions 
and hassle costs into quantifiable, monetary 
terms. We created a “baseline model,” which 
captures the traditional view of health insur-
ance choice as a purely financial decision; 
a “baseline model with inertia,” to account 
for the propensity of people to allow their 
insurance choice to simply roll over from 
year to year; and then a “full model” that 
adds in five additional factors: information 
about plan design features; provider network 
knowledge; consumers’ information on their 
TABLE 3:  RESPONSES TO PLAN NON-FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS, HASSLE COSTS AND MEDICAL EXPENDITURE SURVEY QUESTIONS
 
Question 
 Same HDHP bigger PPO bigger Not sure 
How do the provider networks of the to plans compare? 34.52% 6.04% 12.46% 46.98% 
HDHP-Existing 41.28 6.74 2.76 49.22 
HDHP-New  49.39 3.33 4.20 43.08 
PPO  32.09 6.26 14.48 47.16
 None <1 hour 1.5 hours 6-10 hours 11-20 hours >20 hours Not sure 
How much do you expect to spend in the HDHP? 1.76% 5.99% 21.73% 17.40% 12.88% 24.92% 15.34% 
HDHP-Existing 5.18 19.17 46.11 17.62 5.53 6.39 - 
HDHP-New  3.50 14.71 40.81 22.24 11.21 7.53 - 
PPO  1.17 3.52 16.83 16.83 13.89 28.96 18.79 
...in the PPO? 
PPO 15.85 29.75 29.16 11.35 2.94 4.11 6.85
 Understand,  Accept,  Don’t like,  
 not concerned but concerned no matter what 
How do you feel about spending time managing your health plan? 14.82% 42.52% 42.65% 
HDHP-Existing 39.03 32.64 28.32 
HDHP-New  26.62 39.05 34.33 
PPO  10.76 44.04 45.21
 Correct Overestimate Underestimate Not sure 
How much was spent on you and your dependents in 2011? 36.66% 29.81% 23.31% 10.22% 
HDHP-Existing 41.97 35.75 16.41 5.87 
HDHP-New  37.13 27.85 23.47 11.56 
PPO  36.01 29.35 24.07 10.57
 Very confident Somewhat confident Not confident 
How confident are you in this estimate? 35.85% 43.90% 20.25% 
HDHP-Existing 38.34 49.22 12.44 
HDHP-New  30.11 46.13 23.77 
PPO  36.20 43.05 20.74
 Yes No Not sure 
Do you think you will benefit/would have benefited  16.49% 58.35% 25.16% 
from the HDHP in 2012?  
HDHP-Existing 56.65 23.83 19.52 
HDHP-New  30.47 42.91 26.62 
PPO  10.37 63.99 25.64
“Only 37 percent of employees 
could correctly estimate how 
much they had spent on 
health care in the previous 
year, despite the fact that the 
majority expressed confidence 
in their estimation.”
own health expenditures; knowledge of 
HSA tax benefits; and preferences regarding 
time and hassle costs.
The results of the full model were tell-
ing in explaining why so many employees 
in our sample chose the PPO plan, despite 
the fact that a clear majority of them would 
have been better off with the HDHP. Just 
looking at information about plan design 
features, we found that a single incorrect 
answer about the HDHP causes a consumer 
to value the HDHP by $220 less than a 
consumer with full, accurate information. 
Moreover, those who believed (again, incor-
rectly) that the PPO has a larger network 
of medical providers valued the HDHP by 
$1,726 less than a consumer that under-
stood the provider networks are actually 
identical. Those who underestimated their 
own annual medical expenditures valued the 
HDHP by $279 less than someone who had 
correct knowledge of those expenditures. 
But it was preferences regarding time and 
hassle costs that were the most impactful. 
Those who indicated a “strong distaste” for 
hassle costs valued the HDHP by $87 less 
for each additional stated hour of insurance-
related billing, logistics, and administrative 
tasks. Taken together, information frictions 
and hassle costs in some cases caused con-
sumers to value the HDHP by more than 
$1,000 less than identical individuals that 
did not face these frictions—and, conse-
quently, led many of them to select the PPO 
option, even though they would have been 
better off with the HDHP.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our research carries important implications 
for health care policy, particularly since 
more employers and policymakers have 
been looking specifically to HDHPs to help 
incentivize consumers to reduce “wasteful” 
medical expenditures. However, switching to 
these plans does place an increased financial 
risk burden on consumers, so it is important 
to understand whether the switch is “worth 
it”—i.e., whether the social benefits from 
reduced wasteful expenditures are greater 
than the welfare loss faced by consumers 
from the increased financial risk exposure of 
the HDHP.5
To explore this issue, we went back 
to our data to assess the welfare impact of 
forcing all the employees in our sample that 
opted for the PPO to switch to the HDHP. 
In this, we restricted ourselves to examining 
the specific aspects of insurance choice that 
are the most welfare-relevant: risk prefer-
ences; out-of-pocket health care expenditure 
risk; and idiosyncratic plan preferences. And 
again, we assessed consumer welfare using 
our three different models: the baseline 
model, the baseline model with inertia, and 
the full model that includes information 
frictions and hassle costs. 
By our calculations, the baseline model, 
where consumers are assumed to be very 
risk averse, predicts an average consumer 
welfare loss of $1,475 from forcing consum-
ers to shift from the PPO to the HDHP. 
However, we found that when we account 
for information and hassle costs, risk 
aversion among consumers goes down. In 
other words, when consumers are better 
informed about plan features and expected 
hassle costs, they are more willing to choose 
the HDHP. Consequently they are not as 
risk averse as one would predict without 
accounting for information frictions and 
they are less impacted by the heightened 
risk that an HDHP entails. So the welfare 
loss experienced by consumers goes down 
as well—in our calculations, by two-thirds, 
when compared to the baseline model.
But is the reduction in welfare loss 
sufficient to warrant, in this case, forcing 
consumers into an HDHP? One needs to 
tradeoff the welfare loss from increased risk 
exposure in the HDHP policy with the sav-
ings from reduced use of medical care due 
to having a higher deductible. Our results 
suggest that, after accounting for infor-
mation frictions, the welfare loss is about 
equal to the gains from reduced use of care. 
Therefore, the policy could be justified using 
standard estimates for consumer response 
to prices after accounting for information 
frictions but using the standard model we 
would reach the opposite conclusion.
What does all of this modeling mean 
for policymakers? Good policymaking 
with respect to regulating health insurance 
markets requires a clear understanding of 
how individual consumers make insurance 
choices, as well as the potential impact on 
consumer welfare of limiting or modifying 
the choice environment. As the research 
indicates, policymakers need to factor into 
their thinking not simply the financial 
incentives that drive consumer behavior 
in purchasing health insurance, but also 
the ways in which uncertainty about plan 
features and beliefs about the hassle of 
enrolling in high deductible plans shape 
behavior as well.
Moreover, the research shows the power 
of linking survey data with administra-
tive data to obtain a more accurate and 
nuanced picture of how consumers value 
health insurance and make insurance plan 
decisions. Now that the health insurance 
exchanges have been up and running for a 
year, policy analysts should consider imple-
menting surveys that capture the actual level 
of knowledge among consumers, to better 
understand consumer risk preferences and 
to use that understanding to improve both 
consumer education programs as well as the 
design of the exchanges themselves. As our 
research suggests, there is still much that 
can be done to make sure the exchanges 
account for the full complexity of health 
insurance decision-making.
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